Digital identity verification is now standard practice in conveyancing. However, the technology behind it, including biometrics, NFC chip reading, and liveness detection, is not always well understood.

Here is how it works, what each component does, and why it matters for AML compliance.

How has identity verification in conveyancing changed?

For most of conveyancing’s history, verifying a client’s identity meant checking physical documents in person, such as a passport across a desk, a utility bill, or a driving licence. The process was time-consuming, inconsistent, and increasingly inadequate as fraud became more sophisticated.

Digital identity verification has changed that. Clients can now complete checks remotely using a smartphone, with technology performing in seconds what manual review cannot do reliably. It can confirm not only that a document appears genuine, but that its underlying data is authentic and that the person presenting it is physically present.

In March 2021, HM Land Registry formalised this shift through Practice Guide 81, which introduced the Safe Harbour standard. This set out the requirements for digital identity checks that, if met, protect conveyancers from liability where identity fraud later emerges. Understanding the underlying technology is key to understanding what those requirements mean in practice.

What is biometric verification and how does it work?

Biometric verification forms the foundation of digital identity checks. It uses physical characteristics to confirm that a person is who they claim to be.

In most AML contexts, this involves facial recognition. The client takes a photograph or short video using their device, and the system compares it against the image stored on their identity document. This comparison is carried out algorithmically, analysing the geometry of facial features in a way that is more consistent and reliable than a manual visual check.

Biometric verification is a core requirement of the Safe Harbour standard. The system must confirm that the person presenting the identity matches the image held on the document, rather than simply accepting an uploaded file.

What is NFC chip reading and why is it important?

Modern passports, EU and EEA ID cards, and UK biometric residence permits contain an embedded NFC chip. This chip stores a digital copy of the document’s data, including biometric information and a cryptographic signature from the issuing authority.

When a client places their document against a smartphone, the chip transmits this data. The system can then verify that the digital signature is genuine, confirm that the signing key is valid, and extract the biometric data for comparison against the live image.

This is the most secure form of document verification currently available. While a physical document can be forged, replicating a valid cryptographic signature from an issuing authority is not realistically achievable. For this reason, NFC chip reading is a core part of the Safe Harbour standard.

What is liveness detection and how does it prevent fraud?

Biometric matching and chip reading confirm that a genuine document exists and that the image matches the person presenting it. Liveness detection adds a further layer by confirming that the individual is physically present, rather than using a photograph, mask, or recorded video.

Active liveness requires the user to perform an action, such as blinking or turning their head, to demonstrate that they are present. Because the action is prompted, it can potentially be anticipated and mimicked.

Passive liveness operates in the background without requiring any action from the user. Using machine learning techniques, the system analyses image data to distinguish between a live person and a static or replayed image. Because the user is unaware of the check, passive liveness is generally considered more resilient to spoofing attempts.

Both approaches are used in practice, and understanding the difference is important when assessing providers.

What does the Safe Harbour standard require in practice?

The Safe Harbour standard requires a combination of checks. These include obtaining evidence from a biometric identity document, verifying that document using NFC chip reading, and matching the individual to the document using biometric verification.

For conveyancers acting for sellers, there is an additional requirement to establish a connection between the client and the property.

Where these requirements are met, conveyancers benefit from protection. If a client’s identity is later found to be fraudulent, HM Land Registry will not pursue recourse, provided the checks were carried out correctly.

It is also important to distinguish between standards. The Safe Harbour framework defines the process that must be followed, while the Digital Verification Services Trust Framework governs the providers offering these services. Using a provider listed on the DVS register is increasingly seen as evidence that the underlying technology meets a credible and recognised standard.


Taken together, digital identity verification relies on multiple layers working in combination. Biometric matching confirms identity, NFC chip reading verifies the integrity of the document, and liveness detection ensures the person is genuinely present. The Safe Harbour standard brings these elements together into a defined process that, when followed correctly, provides both compliance and protection.

As expectations continue to evolve, understanding how these components work is essential for assessing providers and ensuring that identity checks are not only completed, but carried out to a standard that stands up to scrutiny.

Identifying politically exposed persons and sanctioned individuals is a core AML obligation, but it is one where the rules have recently shifted.

Here is what PEP and sanctions checks involve, who they apply to, and what the updated rules mean for how firms should approach them.

Why do PEP and sanctions checks matter in AML compliance?

PEP and sanctions screening sit within the broader customer due diligence framework, but they carry particular weight. The concern with politically exposed persons is that their public position creates an elevated risk of corruption or bribery, and that property transactions are a well-established route for laundering the proceeds.

Sanctions checks serve a different but equally serious purpose. They ensure that firms are not facilitating transactions involving individuals or entities subject to legal restrictions.

Both checks are required at onboarding, and both must be kept up to date throughout the life of a matter. A client who was not a PEP at the outset may become one, and sanctions lists are updated frequently.

What is a politically exposed person (PEP)?

A PEP is an individual who is, or has been, entrusted with a prominent public function. This includes heads of state and government, ministers, members of parliament, senior members of the judiciary, senior military officials, members of central banks, and ambassadors, along with their close family members and known close associates.

Under the Money Laundering Regulations, identifying a client as a PEP triggers enhanced due diligence. This includes obtaining senior management approval, taking steps to establish the source of wealth and source of funds, and applying closer ongoing monitoring.

Importantly, being a PEP does not mean refusing to act. It means applying additional scrutiny and documenting the approach taken.

How have the rules on domestic PEPs changed?

The treatment of domestic PEPs, meaning those who hold or have held public functions in the UK, has changed in recent years.

Since January 2024, the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2023 require firms to treat domestic PEPs as lower risk than foreign PEPs as a starting point. This is now set out in legislation, rather than guidance. Unless other risk factors are present, firms should apply a proportionate level of enhanced due diligence.

Further clarification was provided in FCA guidance FG 25/3, published in July 2025. This confirms that non-executive directors of UK civil service bodies should not be treated as PEPs, and reinforces that firms should not refuse or exit relationships solely because a client meets the PEP definition.

In practice, this means risk should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, rather than applied automatically based on a public role.

What are sanctions and how do they apply to law firms?

Sanctions are legal restrictions imposed by governments or international bodies on individuals, companies, or countries, often in response to national security concerns, human rights issues, or foreign policy objectives. In the UK, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation within HM Treasury administers the sanctions regime.

Firms in the regulated sector must not provide services to sanctioned individuals or entities, or facilitate transactions that would benefit them. Breaching sanctions can result in significant criminal and civil penalties, including fines and imprisonment.

Unlike PEP status, which requires judgement around risk, a sanctions match is a clear prohibition. If a client appears on a sanctions list, the matter cannot proceed without specialist legal advice, and reporting obligations may arise.

How often should PEP and sanctions checks be updated?

PEP and sanctions checks should not be treated as a one-off exercise. Both need to be refreshed throughout the life of a matter.

PEP status can change if a client takes on a new public role, and sanctions lists can be updated at short notice in response to international developments. Relying on a single check at onboarding creates a risk that changes will go unnoticed.

Manual processes make this difficult to manage consistently. Automated screening tools that re-check clients against current databases at regular intervals provide a more reliable way to identify changes in status.


Taken together, PEP and sanctions checks are not just about identifying risk at the outset, but about maintaining an accurate and up-to-date understanding of a client’s status throughout the life of a matter. While PEP classification requires proportionate judgement and a risk-based approach, sanctions obligations are absolute and leave no room for discretion.

The direction of travel in regulation is clear: firms are expected to apply these checks consistently, keep them current, and ensure that any changes in status are identified and acted on promptly.

AML compliance is not just about checking individual clients. Every firm in the regulated sector must also have a set of firm-level obligations in place that are documented, approved, and actively maintained.

Here is what the law actually requires, and what good governance looks like in practice, in just 5 minutes.

Why is AML compliance more than just client checks?

When people think about AML compliance in conveyancing, they tend to focus on client-facing checks such as verifying identity, understanding source of funds, and screening for PEPs and sanctions. These obligations are real and important, but they sit on top of a layer of firm-wide requirements that must be in place first.

The Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 impose obligations on the firm as an entity, not just on individual fee-earners dealing with specific matters. Getting these foundations right is critical, as the SRA’s supervisory findings consistently show that weaknesses at firm level tend to flow directly into weaknesses at matter level.

What is a firm-wide AML risk assessment and why does it matter?

The starting point is Regulation 18, which requires every firm in the regulated sector to carry out and document a firm-wide risk assessment. This is a written analysis of the money laundering and terrorist financing risks the firm is exposed to, taking into account its size, client base, the services it offers, the geographic areas it operates in, and the types of transactions it handles.

The assessment must be approved by senior management and kept up to date. It is not a one-off exercise. It should be reviewed whenever the firm’s circumstances change materially, and at regular intervals regardless.

This matters because it sets the context for everything that follows. It defines what higher and lower risk look like for the firm, which in turn informs how individual client and matter risk assessments should be approached.

Who is responsible for AML compliance in a law firm?

Every firm in the regulated sector must appoint a Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO). This is a named individual, typically a senior person within the firm, who is responsible for receiving internal reports of suspicious activity, deciding whether to submit a Suspicious Activity Report to the National Crime Agency, and overseeing the firm’s AML compliance more broadly.

The MLRO role carries real responsibility. The individual appointed needs sufficient seniority, authority, and access to information to carry out the role effectively. In smaller firms, this is often a principal or partner. In larger firms, it may be a dedicated compliance professional. In all cases, the appointment must be documented and properly supported, rather than treated as a formality.

What AML policies, controls and procedures are required?

Regulation 19 requires firms to establish and maintain written AML policies, controls and procedures. These should cover how the firm identifies and verifies clients, how it assesses risk, how it monitors ongoing matters, how suspicious activity is reported internally, how staff are trained, and how compliance is audited.

The policies do not need to be lengthy, but they do need to be meaningful. The SRA has identified cases where firms have adopted template policies without tailoring them to their actual practice, which fails the requirement. Policies should reflect how the firm operates in reality, and staff should understand and follow them in practice.

What AML training do staff need to receive?

All relevant staff must receive regular AML training. This includes not only fee-earners, but anyone involved in client onboarding, financial transactions, or file management. Training should cover what money laundering is, what the firm’s obligations are, how to identify suspicious activity, and how to report concerns internally.

Training also needs to be kept current. A one-off session delivered several years ago is not sufficient. Firms should be able to demonstrate when training was delivered, who received it, and what it covered.

When is an independent AML audit required?

Larger firms, or those with a higher-risk profile, are required under Regulation 21 to have their AML policies and controls independently audited. This does not necessarily mean appointing an external auditor. In some firms, it can be an internal function that sits outside the compliance team.

The key requirement is independence. The purpose of the audit is to assess whether the firm’s AML framework is actually working in practice, rather than simply existing on paper.


Taken together, firm-wide AML obligations form the foundation of effective compliance. A documented risk assessment, a clearly defined MLRO role, tailored policies, regular training, and independent oversight are not separate requirements but parts of a single system.

Where firms fall short is often not in having these elements in place, but in failing to connect them or keep them active. The regulatory expectation is clear: these controls should shape how the firm operates day to day, not exist as static documents created to satisfy a requirement.

Digital ID checks now have a government rulebook, a public register and a trust mark. Here’s what that means for conveyancers carrying out AML checks.

Most people have never read a British Standard, but they know what a Kitemark means.

Digital identity now has its own equivalent. The UK digital verification services (DVS) trust framework sets the rules for identity providers, and since September 2026 the ones that meet its latest version can carry a government trust mark. For conveyancers, though, the bigger change is what the register behind it now means for AML.

What is the DVS trust framework?

The DVS trust framework is the government’s rulebook for organisations that provide digital identity and attribute checks in the UK. It covers how identity data is collected, checked and stored, the security standards that apply, and how providers must deal with fraud, errors and complaints.

Providers are assessed against it by independent, accredited certification bodies. Once certified, they can apply to join the DVS register, a public list that conveyancers, lenders and their clients can all check. Both the framework and the register are run by the Office for Digital Identities and Attributes (OfDIA).

How did it become law?

For several years the framework was voluntary, published in a series of test versions that providers could choose to certify against. That changed on 1 December 2025, when the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 put it on a statutory footing and the DVS register became a statutory register.

Version 1.0, the first full release, was published on 9 June 2026 and came into force on 2 September 2026. Along the way it was renamed from the UK digital identity and attributes trust framework, to match the wording of the Act. Certification is still optional for providers, but it’s the only route onto the register.

What is UK CertifID?

UK CertifID is the government trust mark for services that have been certified against version 1.0 and listed on the DVS register. It appears with a six-digit identifier, which can be checked against the register to confirm it’s genuine.

Because it’s new, not every registered provider will be displaying it yet. Services certified under the earlier version can stay on the register while that certification remains valid, but only those certified against version 1.0 can use the mark.

What does it mean for AML checks?

This is where the register earns its keep. In February 2026, HM Treasury and the government’s digital identity team published guidance on using digital identities with the Money Laundering Regulations. It confirms that, for individual clients, firms can meet the identity verification requirement under Regulation 28 by using a service that is certified and on the DVS register.

It draws the line the other way too. Services that aren’t certified, and so aren’t on the register, can’t reliably be treated as suitable for identity checks under the Regulations.

Two limits are worth keeping in mind. The guidance covers verifying who the client is, not the rest of customer due diligence, so the risk assessment, the purpose of the transaction and source of funds checks still sit with the firm. And the firm remains liable if its due diligence falls short, whichever provider it uses.

How does it compare with HMLR Safe Harbour?

The two are related, but they do different jobs. HM Land Registry’s Digital ID Standard sets out what an identity check in a property transaction should involve, including biometric checks and reading the chip in a passport or identity card. Meet it, and HMLR will treat the conveyancer as having taken reasonable steps to verify identity if fraud later comes to light.

The DVS trust framework works a level up. It governs the providers, not the individual check. Using a registered provider doesn’t by itself mean Safe Harbour has been met, but a firm using one to carry out checks in line with HMLR’s standard is well placed on both counts.

What should conveyancers do now?

For most firms, nothing dramatic. Digital ID checks remain optional, manual checks are still permissible provided they meet the Money Laundering Regulations, and Safe Harbour is still voluntary. What has changed is how easy it is to show that your provider meets the government’s standard. It’s worth:

  • Checking your provider’s entry on the DVS register, and which of its services are listed.
  • Asking whether those services are certified against version 1.0, or when they expect to be.
  • Reflecting the register check in your firm-wide AML policies and procedures.
  • Making DVS registration part of the assessment whenever you choose a new provider.

Sector guidance is still catching up with the changes, so it’s also worth watching for updates to the AML guidance your firm follows.


A Kitemark tells you a product was made to a standard. It doesn’t tell you whether you’ve used it properly.

The DVS register works the same way. A certified, registered provider is now the clearest way to show your identity checks meet the Money Laundering Regulations, but the rest of customer due diligence is still your firm’s job.

Source of funds checks are a core part of AML due diligence, yet they remain one of the areas where conveyancing firms most commonly fall short.

Here is what the obligation actually requires, what good evidencing looks like, and the red flags that should prompt further questions.

Why Source of Funds Trips Firms Up

Of all the AML checks a conveyancing firm carries out, source of funds is the one most likely to feel like it has been done when it has not. A bank statement has been received, a box has been ticked, and the matter moves on. But receiving a document is not the same as scrutinising it, and scrutiny is what the obligation requires.

The SRA’s supervisory findings consistently identify source of funds as an area of weakness. The most common failures are not firms ignoring the check entirely; they are firms accepting documents at face value, failing to follow up on inconsistencies, or not asking for evidence in the first place when the client’s profile and transaction give good reason to.

What the Obligation Actually Is

The requirement to understand source of funds sits within the broader customer due diligence obligations under the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017. Firms must take reasonable steps to understand where the money used in a transaction originates and whether it is consistent with what they know about the client.

“Reasonable steps” is not a fixed standard. It scales with risk. For a straightforward residential purchase funded by a mortgage and a modest deposit from a current account, a bank statement showing the funds may be sufficient. For a cash purchase, a high-value transaction, an overseas client, or any situation where the source of funds is unclear or unexpected, considerably more is required.

Source of funds is distinct from source of wealth, though the two are related. Source of funds focuses on the specific money being used in the transaction. Source of wealth is broader and considers how the client accumulated their assets overall. In higher-risk matters, both may need to be established.

What Good Evidencing Looks Like

Good source of funds evidence answers a simple question: can the money be traced to a legitimate, plausible origin?

For most residential transactions, this means bank statements showing the deposit funds building up over time, or a clear single event such as a property sale, an inheritance, or a gift that explains their arrival. The statement should be recent, unredacted in the relevant sections, and consistent with what the client has told you.

Where funds come from a property sale, the completion statement from that transaction is the natural supporting document. Where funds are a gift, a signed letter confirming the amount, the relationship, and that it is not a loan is standard. This should be supported by evidence that the donor actually holds the funds.

Where funds originate overseas, the bar is higher. Exchange rate movements, international transfer records, and the regulatory environment of the originating country all become relevant. A foreign bank statement should not be accepted without considering whether additional verification is appropriate.

Red Flags in Bank Statements

Receiving a bank statement is the beginning of the process, not the end. When reviewing statements, certain patterns should prompt further questions.

Large, unexplained deposits can indicate layering, where illicit funds are introduced into an account to appear legitimate. Multiple smaller deposits from different sources may suggest structuring, where funds are broken up to avoid detection thresholds.

Inconsistencies with the client’s profile should also be treated carefully. Funds that appear disproportionate to what is known about the client’s occupation, income, or circumstances warrant further enquiry rather than acceptance.

Any indication that documents have been altered, cropped, or are incomplete should be treated as a serious concern. Original documents, or verified electronic statements from the bank, are preferable where there is any doubt.

When to Ask More Questions

A useful test is whether the explanation of funds feels plausible when set against everything else known about the client. If it does not, that instinct is worth acting on.

The obligation is not to prove that funds are clean, but to take reasonable steps to be satisfied that they are. Where something does not add up, further questions are required. If a satisfactory explanation cannot be obtained, the matter may need to be referred to the MLRO.

Proceeding without adequate source of funds evidence exposes the firm to regulatory risk and, in some cases, criminal liability.


Ultimately, source of funds checks are not about collecting documents, but about forming a clear and defensible understanding of where money has come from. The standard applied should reflect the level of risk, increasing where transactions are higher value, more complex, or less predictable. Where firms fall short is not usually in starting the process, but in stopping too early. The SRA’s expectation is clear: scrutiny matters, and if something does not make sense, it is not enough to record it and move on.

In 2023, a solicitor was convicted for the first time ever for tipping off, alerting a client that they were under investigation for money laundering. It was a landmark moment.

Here is what tipping off means in practice, where the line is, and how to stay well clear of it.

Why has tipping off become a focus for law firms?

For years, tipping off appeared in AML training as a theoretical risk. Solicitors understood it was an offence, but many assumed enforcement actions were rare or confined to other sectors.

The 2023 conviction changed that perception. A solicitor was found guilty under section 333A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, marking the first time a member of the legal profession had been convicted of this specific offence. The case sent a clear signal that the legal sector is within scope for enforcement and that regulators are taking a more active interest.

Understanding what tipping off means in practice, and where the risks arise in day-to-day work, is now an essential part of AML compliance.

What is tipping off under UK AML law?

Tipping off occurs when someone who knows or suspects that a Suspicious Activity Report has been made discloses information to another person in a way that is likely to prejudice any resulting investigation.

In practical terms, if a report has been submitted or is suspected to have been submitted, the firm must not inform the client. This includes avoiding any statements or behaviour that could suggest they are under scrutiny.

The offence applies across the regulated sector, including legal professionals, and carries a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment and an unlimited fine.

Where is the line between communication and tipping off?

Two conditions must be met for the offence to arise. The person making the disclosure must know or suspect that a report has been made, and the disclosure must be likely to prejudice an investigation.

In practice, the definition of what may prejudice an investigation is broad. Referring to delays as being due to “compliance reasons”, providing vague or evasive explanations, or indicating that a matter has been escalated internally may create risk depending on the context.

The safest approach is to avoid any reference to the existence of a report. Where a transaction is delayed, a neutral explanation such as the need to complete standard checks or allow more time is generally acceptable, provided it does not imply that a report has been made.

What is the SAR moratorium period and why does it matter?

Where a Suspicious Activity Report is submitted requesting consent to proceed with a transaction, the firm must wait for a response from the National Crime Agency.

The initial period is seven working days. If no refusal is received within that time, consent is deemed to have been granted. If consent is refused, a further 31-day moratorium period applies during which the transaction cannot proceed.

During this time, the client cannot be told why the matter is delayed. This creates a practical challenge, as clients may expect progress and seek explanations. Firms that manage this risk effectively tend to prepare standard responses in advance rather than relying on ad hoc explanations.

What related offences should firms be aware of?

Section 342 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 creates a separate offence of prejudicing an investigation. Unlike tipping off, this does not require a report to have been made. If someone knows or suspects that an investigation is underway and takes steps that could interfere with it, the offence may apply.

This reinforces the need for caution at an early stage. The risk does not begin only once a report is submitted, but from the point at which suspicion arises.

How should firms manage tipping off risk in practice?

Managing tipping off risk requires preparation rather than improvisation. All staff involved in client work should understand what tipping off is and why careful communication matters.

The Money Laundering Reporting Officer should be involved as soon as a report is being considered, so that communication with the client can be managed consistently. Firms should also develop agreed language for responding to delays or questions, ensuring that fee-earners are not required to decide how to respond in real time.

It is also important to recognise that internal reporting to the MLRO is not tipping off. It is a separate legal obligation and a critical part of the firm’s AML framework.


Tipping off is best understood as a risk that arises from how information is communicated, rather than from the act of reporting itself. Once suspicion exists, even well-intentioned explanations can create exposure if they suggest what is happening behind the scenes. The legal threshold is broad, and the consequences are significant.

Firms that manage this effectively do so by putting clear processes, training, and agreed client communication in place so that responses are measured, consistent, and do not depend on judgement in the moment.

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